New Government, New Germany?

I hope the next chancellor brings a bold to-do list and a sprinkle of chutzpah

Olaf Scholz says Auf Wiedersehen. Img: © Raimond Spekking / CC BY-SA 4.0

As the Olaf Scholz era of modern Germany is drawing to a close, I cannot help but ponder how it will go down in history — after all, thinking about such things is an occupational hazard when you are a historian. It will undoubtedly be remembered as one of the shortest chancellorships in German post-war history, but also, I think, as one of extraordinarily weak leadership.

The next chancellor must do things differently. It is no longer enough to manage and talk up the steady decline. What Germany needs now — and this is still a rather controversial thing to say 80 years after the end of the Second World War — is a government that dares to define German interests and pursue them with confidence.

Scholz once said: 'Order leadership from me, and you’ll receive it'. This motto became a favourite point of ridicule for his enemies. But it has to be said that, looking back on his time in office, it seems almost ironic. In domestic politics, the three years of Scholz's rule were so marked by coalition infighting that people will probably soon only remember them as the 'traffic light' era (named after the colours of the parties involved), while the Chancellor's name escapes them. In foreign policy, Scholz was known for talking a lot and doing very little, for which the word 'scholzing' was coined especially. The result was a damaging consensus of pessimism in German politics and society.

Whether on migration, the economy or war - Scholz did not give Germans the feeling that their country had a say in the matter of its own fate. When it came to asylum reform, which surveys show a large majority of citizens want, the Chancellor warned that this was not possible under EU law. The fact that the economy has shrunk for two years in a row under Scholz is said to be due to global crises. In geopolitical terms, Germany is depicted as a 'middling power' that has to take its cue from others. Assuming otherwise, Scholz mused, would be ‘megalomaniacal’. I’ve never heard France or Britain refer to themselves as ‘middling powers’ despite both being smaller economies than Germany.

For Scholz, things simply are as they are. As chancellor, he sees his role as that of their prudent administrator, as did his predecessor in office, Angela Merkel. Germans have to accept that they cannot decide who is in the country, that the trains do not run on time, that energy prices remain high and that Germany has little say in the urgent diplomatic tussle over the war in Ukraine.

One of the biggest challenges for the next government, likely led by the conservative Friedrich Merz, will be to restore some self-confidence and optimism in the country. Chris Reiter and Will Wilkes, two journalists at Bloomberg, argue in their newly published book Broken Republik: The Inside Story of Germany’s Descent into Crisis that of all the massive problems in Germany, 'perhaps the most dangerous is a creeping fatalism'. They are not wrong, given that the world's third-largest economy continues to talk itself down.

Britain and France also face huge challenges. But 'the British still cheer for their monarchs and can bridge the chaos of Brexit with their sense of humour, and the French would go back to the barricades to defend their republic,' say the two authors. French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer are both struggling with deep divisions in their countries. Nevertheless, they present themselves confidently on the world stage in order to actively influence the outcome of the war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Scholz travelled to London at Starmer's invitation last weekend to take part in talks but appeared like a marginal figure.

Now, one could argue that the change of government has put Germany in a position where it is difficult for Berlin to speak with one voice. But the problem goes much deeper. Germany has difficulty representing its interests because it does not define what these interests actually are. Other major industrial powers tend to define a 'Grand Strategy', basically a list of their interests and ideas as to how to pursue them strategically. Everything else flows from there.

In Germany, however, many people are sceptical about the very concept of strategy. After all, the last time Germany did have a strategy, it ended in absolute catastrophe for itself, Europe and the world. Besides, there didn’t seem to be a need for a Grand Strategy after the war. The fates of the two German states were in the hands of the superpowers. Even in recent decades, the German economy was doing its thing, prosperity seemed secure, and wars were limited in scale and mostly being fought by others. It should be clear by now, however, that the geopolitical colossus of Germany cannot continue to drift aimlessly through Europe and the world. That is neither good for the country itself nor for its neighbours and partner states.

Germany is a country with enormous resources and ingenuity. With political will, a lot could be achieved domestically, too. For example, if a Grand Strategy had included that keeping energy prices stable was a high priority for economic and social reasons, then the last government wouldn’t have tried and failed to dictate to people how to heat their own homes at great political and social costs. It would also not have turned off nuclear power plants at the height of a war-induced energy crisis despite the fact that they were considered among the safest in the world, run in a climate-friendly manner and accounted for almost a third of Germany's electricity generation 20 years ago.

Problems can be tackled as long as there is a strategy and the will to implement it. But if you talk about 'German interests' you may promptly find yourself accused of a Trump-style 'Germany First' approach. But it is neither isolationist nor ‘megalomaniacal’ to assume that Germany, as an economic heavyweight and with its central geopolitical location, can and should exert influence on world politics. Germany would be a more reliable partner to its allies if it knew what it wanted and worked towards it strategically. The feeling that the federal government in Berlin wants to actively shape things and has the confidence to improve the country would also contribute a lot domestically to Germans looking to the future with more confidence and allow them to plan, live and vote accordingly.

The political scientist Timo Lochocki also sees it this way. In his new book German Interests: How we will become the strongest democracy in the world - and thereby save the liberal West he writes that 'we should redefine Germany's role in Europe and the world and finally play to our strengths', because Germany is still 'stable and capable of reform.' When I recently sat down with the author at a political seminar in Germany, he did not speak of an us-against-them approach but of optimism and a new beginning.

The opportunity for such a new beginning presented itself after the end of the long Merkel era in 2021. However, both major parties, the centre-left SPD and the centre-right CDU/CSU, then chose unimaginative continuity candidates as thei chancellor candidates rather than fresh faces with the potential to bring a degree of optimism and creativity to the job. Friedrich Merz will not have an easy time convincing people that he will be a breath of fresh air. In a recent survey , only 42% of respondents believed that he would be a good chancellor. In the former East Germany, the figure was as low as 28%.

Merz will therefore have to work hard to convince citizens and businesses that a new style of politics is coming to Berlin, one that will give the country back its self-confidence and determination, and thus restore the asset that allows a democracy to function in the long term: optimism, i.e. the belief that each new generation will be better off than the last. Creating credible hope for a better future is a huge challenge, but one that every German chancellor will be measured against.

This is a translated and edited version of my column in the Berliner Zeitung this weekend.